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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20060328-CA

vs.
JOHN ANGELO GARCIA,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The State appeals from an order suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a search
warrant, in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. This Courthas jurisdiction to consider the petition
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in concluding that defendant had standing to challenge
the search of the duffle bag when the record does not support a legitimate expectation of
privacy?
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in failing to determine whether the affidavit used to
procure a warrant for the search of defendant's apartment was adequate to support probable
cause even when the tainted evidence of 32 pounds of marijuana is redacted?

Standards of Review for Both Issues: A trial court's factual findings underlying a
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v.
Duran, 2005 UTApp 4 0 9 4 10> 131 P.3d246. However, the trial court's conclusions of law,
and its application of the law to the facts, are reviewed under correctness standard, according
no deference to the trial court. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, Tf 11,103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in pertinent part:
U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and his brother, Jeremiah Andrew Garcia, were charged by Information
with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (psilocin and marijuana)
with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004); and one count of endangerment of a child,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (West 2004). R. 1-2.
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial. R. 108.
By minute order dated March 21, 2006, the court granted defendant's motion to
suppress after concluding that the search of the duffle bag violated defendant's constitutional
rights. R. 79; 90-91.
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On March 31,2006, the State filed a motion to dismiss the charges against defendant
because suppression of the evidence in the duffle bag and other evidence recovered afterward
pursuant to the search warrant had "substantially impaired the State's case . . . " R. 81.
The court granted the State's motion by order dated April 3, 2006. R. 82.
The State timely appealed. R. 93.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The mysterious duffle bag
When Salt Lake City police officers confronted two suspects leaving the scene of a
reported robbery, one thing became immediately apparent: They were reluctant to part with a
large, nylon duffle bag. R. 74 (Affidavit for Search Warrant, dated October 12, 2005),
Addendum A.1 When officers challenged them, the two men fled back into the apartment
they were exiting, hauling the duffle bag with them. Id. Moments later, officers again
encountered one of the suspects climbing out onto a balcony attached to the apartment. Id.
Once he was outside, someone inside handed out the duffle bag. Id. When officers again
challenged the suspect, he ducked back inside, leaving the duffle bag on the balcony. Id
Officers returned to the front door of the apartment and knocked on the door. Id.
Someone shouted back that everything was "OK." Id. Still, those inside refused to open the
door. Id. The officers said they needed to come inside to investigate a possible robbery
reported by a downstairs neighbor who told officers she had seen three males, one wearing a

1

The affidavit was also admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 1 during a hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress.
3

ski mask, running away from the apartment. Id. The officers told those inside that they
would have to force the door open "to verify that everything is ok." Id. The door finally
swung open. Id.
Plain smell of marijuana
Once inside, officers were immediately aware of the smell of burnt marijuana. On a
sofa, in plain view, was a baggie of marijuana. Id. In a search of the duffle bag left on the
balcony, officers discovered about 32 pounds of marijuana, as well as psilocybin
mushrooms. Id. Officers also noticed money stashed behind a mirror that had been knocked
off the wall near the balcony. Id,
Officers secured the premises and prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant.
R. 108:14. The defendant and was arrested and advised of his rights per Miranda. R.
108:10. Several other people were in the apartment—a 17-year-old girl, her mother and an
infant. Id.
After the search warrant was obtained, officers seized the marijuana in the duffle bag
along with additional controlled substances and miscellaneous paraphernalia. R. 108:6.
They found a brown box with several grams of mushrooms underneath a bed in what
appeared to be a child's room. Id. In the closet next to a crib, they found four bags of

2

It is unclear from the record whether the duffle bag was open when officers located
the marijuana. During the preliminary hearing, Detective Lyman Smith of the Salt Lake City
police department stated that he had been told that the duffle bag was unzipped. R. 108:15.
However, he acknowledged, in response to questions from defense counsel, that a police
report prepared by another officer suggested that the officers opened the duffle bag. R.
108:15.
4

marijuana weighing approximately four pounds. Id. Officers also found a great deal of
marijuana residue or "shake" covering counter tops in the kitchen, the floor and on top of the
TV and stereo. R. 108:5.
During a post-Miranda interview with Detective Lyman Smith, defendant admitted
the marijuana was his and that he was selling it. R. 108:10-11. Defendant said he sells
quantities of "a half pound or more. He doesn't do small quantities." R. 108:11. He also
said that he "only deals with organic material... meaning marijuana and mushrooms, and
that's the only stuff he'll deal with and sell." Id.
Duffle bag evidence suppressed
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the duffle bag, R.
4; 61 -63. He argued that evidence recovered pursuant to the search warrant was "fruit of the
poisonous tree," because the warrant was based on an unlawful search of the duffle bag. R.
62.
On March 20,2006, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. R. 107.
The State opposed the motion for two reasons. First, defendant had not claimed or
demonstrated an interest in the duffle bag and, therefore, had no standing to challenge the
search. R. 65-67; 107:5-7. Second, even assuming the duffle bag was illegally searched, the
affidavit prepared by Salt Lake police in support of their request for a warrant to search
defendant's apartment contained sufficient additional information—the smell of burnt
marijuana and the baggie of green leafy material in plain view on the sofa—to support
probable cause. R. 67-70.
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After the court took the State's argument on lack of standing under advisement, R.
107:7, the State called Detective Doug Teerlink, Salt Lake City P olice Department, to testify
concerning the circumstances of defendant's arrest and the search of the duffle bag. R.
107:8. Detective Teerlink, one of several officers who responded to the scene, prepared the
affidavit for the search warrant for the apartment.

R. 107:9. He began to discuss

information provided from other officers for use in the affidavit when defendant's counsel
objected to the testimony as hearsay. R. 107:8-9. The court sustained the objection. R.
107:9.3
Detective Teerlink then started to recount the circumstances that led to the seizure of
the marijuana in the duffle bag, but defense counsel once again objected. R. 107:9-l 0. The
court again sustained the objection. R. 107:10.
At the hearing's conclusion, the court took the matter under advisement and later
granted the motion to suppress. The court stated: "The warrantless search of the black duffel
bag violated [defendant's] rights." R. 91 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated
April 3,2006), Addendum B. For that reason, "[t]he contents of the duffel bag and all items
recovered thereafter are fruits of the poisonous tree" and must be suppressed. Id. The court
also concluded that defendant had standing to challenge the search of the duffle bag. Id.

3

The court erred in sustaining the hearsay objection because the rules of evidence do
not apply in suppression hearings. See, e.g. State v. Clifford, 1999 WL 33244693 (Utah.
App.) (Memorandum Decision), Addendum C; see also Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(1) and Utah
R. Evid. 104(a). "A defendant who wishes to make an evidentiary challenge.. must proceed
to trial and make the evidentiary challenge there." Id. n. 1.
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The trial court erred in determining the defendant had established "standing"
to challenge the admission of the evidence recovered from the duffle bag. Defendant offered
no evidence at the suppression hearing, and the record does not demonstrate, that defendant
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the duffle bag. Thus, the court erred in
determining defendant had Fourth Amendment standing.
Point II: Even without the 32 pounds of marijuana recovered from the duffle bag,
the search affidavit provided sufficient information to support probable cause to search
defendant's apartment. The affidavit stated that officers responding to a report of a
robbery observed the furtive, evasive behavior of two men who appeared determined to
elude officers and remove the duffle bag from the apartment. Once officers were
admitted to the apartment, they immediately smelled burnt marijuana and saw a baggie of
what appeared to be marijuana sitting on a sofa. Thus, even assuming that the initial
search of the duffle bag was unlawful and that it cannot be used to support probable
cause, the search affidavit still contained sufficient information to support probable cause
for a search of defendant's apartment.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT
HAD STANDING TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
CONTENTS OF THE DUFFLE BAG.

Defendant presented no evidence to support his claim that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the duffle bag and the trial court, accordingly, erred in concluding
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that defendant had Fourth Amendment standing to contest the recovery of 32 pounds of
marijuana from the duffle bag.
"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional
rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,134 (1978); accord
United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73,76 (10th Cir. 1994); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 64 (Utah
App. 1990). Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not redound to the benefit of those who
have no reasonable interest in the item or place searched. Id. A defendant who moves to
suppress evidence is required to establish his Fourth Amendment standing. State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 889, 887 (Utah App. 1990). Once the State objects to a defendant's
"standing" to challenge a search, "[t]he defendant must factually demonstrate that he does
have standing to contest the warrantless search." Id. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
Evidence is admissible . . .until the accused has established that his rights
under the rule have been invaded. Therefore, it is entirely proper to require of
one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search... that he establish that he
himself was a victim of an invasion of privacy. . . .
State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958, 960 (Utah 1966); accord State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056,
1057 (Utah App. 1992) (finding that "the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy
must be established by the party challenging the police conduct."). Indeed, Fourth
Amendment standing is a "threshold requirement that a defendant must satisfy in order to
establish a violation of constitutional rights." Atwood, 831 P.2d at 1058.
To establish Fourth Amendment standing, a defendant must prove that he or she has
"a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place or thing searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
In addressing whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the court
8

determines "first, whether the defendant 'exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy/ and second, whether that subjective expectation is 'one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable."5 Webb, 791 P.2d at 80 (quoting United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d
285 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1019 (1988). Factors relevant to this inquiry include
whether the defendant had any possessory or proprietary interest in the place searched or the
item seized; was legitimately on the premises; could exclude others from that place;
exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would remain free from governmental
invasion; or took normal precautions to maintain his privacy. Id.
Establishing Fourth Amendment standing to contest the search of a residence does not
necessarily mean a defendant has standing to contest the search of items or containers inside
the residence. See, e.g., Webb, 790 P.2d at 83 (defendant lacked standing to challenge search
of wife's purse). "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through
the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or
property has not had any of his fourth amendment rights infringed." Id. (citing Rakas, 439
U.S. at 134).
The trial court ruled defendant had standing to challenge the search of the duffle bag.
R. 91. This conclusion is premised on the apparent factual finding that defendant lived at the
apartment that was searched pursuant to the warrant. See R. 90 ("Salt Lake City officers
entered the apartment of Mr. Garcia"). However, there was no evidence introduced at the
suppression hearing to indicate that defendant lived at the apartment. Nor was there any
evidence to suggest defendant owned the duffle bag. Thus, defendant has not met the
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threshold requirement to establish that he has standing to challenge the search of the duffle
bag or, for that matter, the apartment. See Webb, 790 P.2d at 80 (defendant testifies at
suppression hearing for limited purpose of establishing residence and standing to bring
motion).
Defendant could have offered evidence that he lived at the apartment. At defendant's
preliminary hearing, Detective Lyman Smith testified that he interviewed defendant
following his arrest and that defendant stated that he rented a room at the apartment. R. 4
(Information; Probable Cause Statement, signed by Detective D. Findlay, dated October 18,
2005); see also R. 20 (jail booking sheet with defendant's address). Defendant also said he
was "staying in the north bedroom," R. 108:6, although it appears that the defendant's
brother is the primary renter. R. 108:10.
However, the evidence that might support a claim that defendant had an interest in the
duffle bag is tenuous at best. The record indicates that the balcony where the duffle bag
came to rest was connected to the bedroom where defendant had been staying. R. 108:7.
Defendant also told Detective Smith that the "marijuana was his and didn't belong to
anybody else but him." R. 108:10. Defendant said he sold quantities of "a half pound or
more. He doesn't do small quantities." R. 108:11. He also said that he "only deals with
organic material... meaning marijuana and mushrooms, and that's the only stuff he'll deal
with and sell." Id.
Thus, by his own admission, defendant clearly has an interest in at least some of the
marijuana. But his statements do not establish that he had an interest in the duffle bag,
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which could have belonged to him, his brother, his brother's wife, or perhaps even the wife's
mother, all of whom were present in the apartment when police entered. R. 108:9-10. This is
insufficient to establish standing. Even if the meager evidence from defendant's statements
that he stayed at the apartment were sufficient to establish standing to contest the search of
the apartment, there is no evidence establishing that defendant had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the duffle bag. See, e.g., Webb, 790 P.2d at 83. Without more, defendant has
not shown that he had standing to challenge the search and the trial court's conclusion is,
thus, erroneous.
II.

EVEN WITHOUT THE EVIDENCE FROM THE DUFFLE
BAG, POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO PROCURE A
SEARCH WARRANT.

Even assuming the trial court was correct in finding Fourth Amendment standing, the
court erred in failing to consider whether the search warrant affidavit was sufficient without
the duffle bag evidence. This error is fatal to the trial court's ruling and requires reversal or,
at minimum, remand to consider whether the redacted search affidavit provides probable
cause for the warrant.
The "core rationale" behind the exclusionary rule and the suppression of evidence is
"that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from
violations of constitutional and statutory protections." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442
(1984). However, the deterrence rationale serves no purpose when "the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. at 444. The Nix court explained that
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admitting otherwise tainted evidence is fair because the State gains no advantage and
defendant suffers no prejudice. See id. at 447. "Indeed, suppression of the evidence would
operate to undermine the adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it
would have occupied without any police misconduct." Id.
When a defendant challenges the legality of evidence included in an affidavit
submitted to support probable cause for a search warrant, the defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986,); see also Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). To successfully challenge the validity of a search made
pursuant to a warrant, the defendant must establish (1) the affidavit supporting the warrant
contains a false statement by the affiant made intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly and (2)
the affidavit is insufficient to support probable cause once the misstatement is removed. Id.
(citing Franks, 483 U.S. at 171-72). As the Utah Supreme Court put it:
The obvious purpose of Franks and its progeny is to avoid suppressing
evidence when the actual facts, if known to the magistrate, would have
resulted in a finding of probable cause. Deterrence of police misconduct is
not to be a factor in the decision to suppress unless the misconduct materially
affects the finding of probable cause.
Id.
Courts have construed the Franks requirement to apply to the use of illegally obtained
evidence, which must also be excluded from consideration of the warrant's sufficiency.
"[W]hen faced with a warrant containing information obtained pursuant to an illegal search,
a reviewing court must excise the offending information and evaluate whether what remains
is sufficient to establish probable cause." United States v. Dessesaure, 429 F.3d 359,367 (1 st
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Cir. 2006); accord United States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751, 758-59 (6th Cir.2005).
("[Ajuthority from this and other circuits, as well as the principles underlying the Murray
rule, support an interpretation of the independent source rule that incorporates consideration
of the sufficiency of the untainted affidavit to see if probable cause exists without the tainted
information.") (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)); United States v.
Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he district court should consider whether
the warrant affidavit, once purged of tainted facts and conclusions, contains sufficient
evidence to constitute probable cause for issuance of the warrant"); State v. Bilant, 36 P.3d
883, 889, f 26 (Mont. 2001) ("When a search warrant is based, in part, on illegally obtained
information, the reviewing court shall excise the illegal evidence from the application and
review the remaining information de novo to determine whether probable cause supported
the issuance.").
Thus, if a trial court concludes that some of the evidence in the search warrant
affidavit was improperly included, then it must proceed to the second part of the Franks test
and determine whether the remaining untainted evidence in the search affidavit may still
establish probable cause. Here, the trial court never performed the second step in the Franks
analysis. Despite the urging of the State, R. 68-69, the court granted the motion to suppress
the evidence without considering whether the affidavit established probable cause absent the
allegedly tainted evidence. Had the court performed that test, the result in this case would
have been different. The affidavit in support of the search warrant recounts the officers'
discovery of the plain smell of freshly burnt marijuana as well as "a baggie of a green leafy
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substance in plain view on a couch." R. 74. This discovery was preceded by the report of a
robbery and the furtive, evasive behavior of the two men who apparently attached great
importance to the duffle bag, which they were desperately attempting to remove from the
apartment. Id.; see State v. Church, 2002 WL 31840887 (Del. Super. Ct), (suspect's
backpack deemed "suspicious" by police because drug traffickers transport large quantities
of marijuana in duffle bags, backpacks, trash bags, and cardboard boxes) Addendum C. If
the trial court had properly reviewed the redacted warrant, it would have or at least should
have concluded that the officers had probable cause for the search. State v. South, 885 P.2d
795, 800 (Utah App. 1994) (smell of burnt marijuana emanating from a home provides
officers with probable cause to seek a warrant), rev yd on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah
1996); State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, \ 22, 131 P.3d 246 (smell of burning marijuana
provides probable cause, but not exigent circumstances, so officers must seek a warrant); see
also Bilant, 36 P.3d at 889, ^ 28 (Mont. 2001) (investigative subpoena for defendant's
medical records supported by probable cause, despite officer's illegal phone inquiry to
defendant9 s medical provider, because defendant admitted at accident scene that he had been
drinking and had taken prescription medication); State v. Beeken, 585 N.W.2d 865, 874
(Neb. App. 1998) (mention in search affidavit of discovery of "roach clip" during illegal
search did not invalidate search warrant, which was amply supported by probable cause
without the roach clip); seePeoplev. Cohen, 496 N.E.2d 1231,1234(111. App. 1986) (trained
officer detecting odor of burnt marijuana establishes probable cause of substance's
presence); cf. United States v. Shamaezideh, 80 F.3d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir. 1996) (when

14

information gleaned from illegal search excised, statement from upstairs resident that "other
occupants of the house were growing marijuana" did not support probable cause for search
of basement apartment).
In short, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to conduct a proper
Franks analysis to determine if the redacted affidavit supported probable cause to search
defendant's apartment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court reverse the trial court's suppression order, first,
because the court erred in concluding defendant had Fourth Amendment standing and,
second, because the search affidavit supported probable cause despite the illegal search of
the duffle bag. Alternatively, this Court should remand with instructions to the trial court to
conduct a Franks inquiry to determine if the affidavit supported probable cause
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of October, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of October, 20061 caused to be U.S. Mail two copies of
the foregoing to:
Joan C. Watt
Steven Shapiro
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Addenda

Addendum A

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT

No.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah.
Proof by Affiant under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Doug
Teerlink, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe:
That your affiant has reason to believe that on the premises known as 1703 South 700
East apartment C, further described as a triplex constructed of grey brick with white trim.
The structure is located on the southeast comer of 1700 South 700 East and the front of
the triplex faces to the west. The numbers 1703 are clearly above the front porch of the
triplex in black letters. There are stairs leading from the front porch up to apartment C.
The stairs are located on the south side of the structure. The letter C is printed on the
north side of the stairs and is black in color. The door to apartment number C is located
at the top of the stairs, it is white in color and faces to the south. And all rooms, attics,
and other parts therein and the surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, and
out buildings of any kind located upon the curtilage of the complex which are designated
for the use of apartment C.
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, There is now certain property or evidence
described as:
Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession
or distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug
paraphernalia described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana.
Articles of personal property tending to establish and document sales of a controlled
substance including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and other documentation of
sales of a controlled substance; articles tending to establish the identity of persons in
control of the premises sought to be searched including rent receipts, utility receipts, and
addressed envelopes, and any other fruits or instrumentality's of the crimes of possession
or distribution of a controlled substance.

And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
or has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the
purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of
an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal
conduct
You are therefore commanded at anytime day or night (good cause having been shown)
to make a search of the above described premises for the hereinabove described property
or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it before me at the Third
District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in your
custody, subject to the order of this court.

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

STATE OF UTAH)
: ss
County of Salt Lake)

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That your affiant has reason to believe that on the premises known as 1703 South 700 East
apartment C, further described as a triplex constructed of grey brick with white trim. The
structure is located on the southeast corner of 1700 South 700 East and the front of the triplex
faces to the west. The numbers 1703 are clearly above the front porch of the triplex in black
letters. There are stairs leading from the front porch up to apartment C. The stairs are located on
the south side of the structure. The letter C is printed on the north side of the stairs and is black
in color. The door to apartment number C is located at the top of the stairs, it is white in color
and faces to the south. And all rooms, attics, and other parts therein and the surrounding grounds
and any garages, storage rooms, and out buildings of any kind located upon the curtilage of the
complex which are designated for the use of apartment C.
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, There is now certain property or evidence described
as:
Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession or
distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia
described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana.
Articles of personal property tending to establish and document sales of a controlled substance
including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and other documentation of sales of a controlled
substance; articles tending to establish the identity of persons in control of the premises sought to
be searched including rent receipts, utility receipts, and addressed envelopes, and any other fruits
or instrumentality's of the crimes of possession or distribution of a controlled substance.
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it
as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
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Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime(s) of
Distribution and Possession of a Controlled Substance.
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH
WARRANT ARE:
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer for over 5 years.
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Narcotic Unit and
investigates narcotic related offenses. Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and
in the investigation of narcotic related offenses through the Utah Police Academy and the
California Narcotics Association. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA
Clandestine Laboratory Course. Your affiant has worked street level drug interdiction as an
arresting officer and as an undercover police officer. Your affiant has seen several different types
of narcotics during these operations. Your affiant has been involved with over 300 drug related
cases, many of which were felonies.
Your affiant has reason to believe that the individuals who reside or otherwise occupy 1703
South 700 East apartment C are engaging in a narcotics distribution operation.
On the evening of October 11, 2005 Salt Lake City Police Officers responded to the listed
apartment on a possible robbery in progress call. The female complaint was at the listed address
in apartment A. Apartment A is below apartment C. She said that she heard people upstairs in
the above apartment. She then saw three males leaving apartment C and running away. One of
males was wearing a ski mask. When Police Officers arrived a short time later, they heard
yelling coming from the listed apartment. The Officers then saw a male adult coming out of the
listed apartment. He was wearing a stocking cap and carrying a duffel bag.
Police Officer
challenged the male and he ran back into the apartment. Police Officers knocked on the
apartment door and the persons inside said everything is ok but they would not open the door.
Police Officers then observed the male who was carrying the duffel bag go out the back door
onto a balcony. Someone from inside the apartment handed the male the duffel bag. Police
Officers challenge the male again. The male dropped the duffel bag and went back into the
apartment. Police Officer told the persons inside the apartment that they needed to come in and
verify that everything is ok. Officers told the persons in the apartment to open the door or they
would kick it in. The persons inside the apartment then let the police into the apartment.
The Police Officers who went into the apartment could smell a strong smell of fresh burnt
marijuana in the apartment. They observed a small baggie of a green leafy substance in plain
view on a couch. Officers found that duffel bag the male dropped on the balcony contained large
amounts of a green leafy substance that appears to be marijuana. The Officers also observed that
a mirror had been knocked off the wall near the balcony had some money hidden behind it.
Your affiant desires to enter 1703 South 700 East and search for marijuana, marijuana
paraphernalia and other items related to the distribution of marijuana. The paraphernalia
includes such items as pipes, bongs, rolling papers or tubes used to inhale or smoke marijuana.
Other related items include packaging material used to package marijuana and scales used to
weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these items are almost
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always found on the premises where search warrants for controlled substances have been
executed.
Your affiant desires to search for records of marijuana sales, both written and electronic,
residency papers and U.S. currency. Your affiant knows from past experiences with narcotic
investigations that persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts purchased and
drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that marijuana is sold for
money or stolen property.
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court
by Deputy District Attorney m
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items
any time day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons to wit:
Police Officers are currently securing the listed apartment until the search warrant is written and
signed.

Detective Doug Teerlink
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

\Z^

OrhW^

^

day of

2005. {$'&***»

Addendum B

STEVEN G. SHAPIRO (#6330)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION

MR - 5 2QQB
SALTL

Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN ANGELO GARCIA,

CaseNo.051907326FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court for argument on March 20, 2006, the Court
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
Findings of Fact
1. On October 12, 2005, Salt Lake City Police officers entered the apartment of Mr.
Garcia.
2. Officers located and searched a large black duffel bag which contained a large quantity
of marijuana without first having obtained a search warrant.
3. Officers immediately thereafter requested and obtained a search warrant for the
apartment.
4. Additional evidence was located pursuant to the subsequent search.
1

Conclusions of Law
Based on the facts as determined above, the Court makes the following Conclusions of
Law:
1. Mr. Garcia has standing to contest the search of the black bag as the bag was located
inside his residence.
2. The warrantless search of the black duffel bag violated Mr. Garcia's rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
3. The contents of the black duffel bag and all items recovered thereafter are fruits of the
poisonous tree and must accordingly be suppressed.
4. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is Granted.

q\

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District

'A

Attorney, 1111 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this JM-^day of March, 2006.

«u
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Not Reported in A.2d
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 31840887 (Del.Super.)
(Cite as: Not Reported in A.2d)

Only the Westlaw citation is currently
available.
UNPUBLISHED
OPINION.
CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Superior Court of Delaware.
STATE of Delaware
v.
Khyon E. CHURCH, Defendant.
No. 0104008667.
Submitted Oct. 21,2002.
Decided Dec. 18,2002.
Upon Defendant's Consolidated Motion to
Supress £M&ence Denied.
Joelle M. Wright, Deputy Attorney General,
New Castle County, State of Delaware, for
the State of Delaware.
Joseph A, Hurley, for Defendant.
ORDER
ABLEMAN, J.
*1 This is the Court's decision on a
Consolidated Motion to Suppress Evidence
seized during a search of Khyon E. Church's
("Defendant") residence located at 6 S. Gray
Avenue, Wilmington, Delaware. Following
the search, which was incident to a warrant,
Defendant was charged by a Grand Jury
indictment with numerous drug and
weapons offenses including, Trafficking, in
Cocaine and Possession of a Firearm During
the Commission of a Felony.— Defendant
submits that the evidence should be
suppressed because the affidavit in support
of the search warrant lacked probable cause
to support a search of the 6 S. Gray Avenue
premises. Specifically, Defendant claims
that the affidavit failed to establish a nexus
between the items sought and the

Defendant's residence, thereby violating his
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 1, §
6 of the Delaware Constitution. As will be
discussed more fully hereafter, since the
four corners of the affidavit meet the
probable cause standard for the issuance of a
search warrant, the Consolidated Motion to
Suppress is denied.
FN1. On May 15, 2001, Defendant
was indicted on the following
offenses: Trafficking in Marijuana in
violation of Title 16, § 4753(a)(1)(a)
of the Delaware Code; Trafficking in
Cocaine in violation of Title 16, §
4753A(a)(2)(a) of the Delaware
Code; Possession With Intent to
Deliver a Non-Narcotic Schedule I
Controlled Substance in violation of
Title 16, § 4752 of the Delaware
Code; Possession with Intent to
Deliver a Narcotic Schedule II
Controlled Substance in violation of
Title 16, $ 4751 of the Delaware
Code; Possession of a Firearm
during the Commission of a Felony
in violation of Title 11, § 1447A of
the Delaware Code; Use of a
Dwelling for Keeping Controlled
Substances (1725 W. 2nd Street) in
violation of Title 16, § 4755(a)(5) of
&e Delaware Crate/, Use of &
Dwelling for Keeping Controlled
Substances (6 S. Gray Avenue) in
violation of Title 16, $ 4755(a)(5) of
the Delaware Code; Use of a Vehicle
for Keeping Controlled Substances
in violation of Title 16, § 4755(a)(5)
of the Delaware Code; Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia in violation of
Title 16, § 4771 of the Delaware
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Code; Possession of a Controlled
Substance Within 300 Feet of a Park
or Recreation Area in violation of
Title 16, $ 4768 of the Delaware
Code.
Statement of Facts
During the first week of March 2001,
Officers Vincent Jordan and Hector
Cuadrado of the City of Wilmington Police
Department were contacted by a past proven
reliable informant who advised them that a
black male, known only as "Ky," was
selling large amounts of marijuana from his
dwelling at 1725 W. 2nd Street in the City of
Wilmington. The officers then contacted the
security division of Conectiv Power and
learned that the utilities for 1725 W. 2 nd
Street were registered in the name of Khyon
E. Church. Checks for driver's license, social
security number, and Department of Motor
Vehicles
photographic
identification
confirmed these connections. Although the
Department of Motor Vehicles identified
Defendant's registered address as 2
Commonwealth Boulevard, New Castle,
Delaware, the social security number
associated with the driver's license matched
the social security number in the records of
Conectiv Power. Thus, the identification
investigation results all positively matched
the Defendant with the premises located at
1725 W. 2nd Street.
Based on the foregoing information, the
officers commenced surveillance of 1725 W.
2nd Street during the fourth week of March
2001. While conducting surveillance, the
officers observed a black male whom they
believed to be the Defendant leave the
premises with another unknown male who
was carrying a backpack. Both males
entered a dark colored 1994 Lexus and
proceeded to 6 S. Gray Avenue. The police
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officers' experience led them to be
suspicious since drug traffickers transport
large quantities of marijuana in duffle bags,
backpacks, trash bags, and cardboard
boxes.— The officers responded to 6 S.
Gray Avenue and observed Defendant walk
to the front door, check his mailbox, and use
a key to open the front door and enter the
premises. The officers conducted a
registration check on the Lexus and learned
that the vehicle was registered to William R.
Church of 2 Commonwealth Boulevard,
New Castle, Delaware, the same address
listed on Defendant's driver's license.
FN2.
Suppression
Hearing
Transcript, dated October 15, 2001,
at 7 (hereinafter, Suppression Hr'g
Tr.at
.").
*2 The officers continued the surveillance,
observing the Defendant leave 6 S. Gray
Avenue and return to the Lexus still
occupied by the unknown male passenger.
Defendant and his passenger proceeded in
the Lexus to Up the Creek Restaurant. At
this juncture, undercover Detective Henry
Cannon of the Wilmington City Police
continued the surveillance. Detective
Cannon entered the restaurant and observed
the Defendant and his passenger seated at a
table conversing with a white male whom
Detective Cannon believed was an employee
of the restaurant. At one point, Defendant
and the unidentified white male left the
table, entered the restroom, and returned
shortly thereafter. Since the two remained in
the restroom for such a short span of time, it
was Detective Cannon's belief that a drug
transaction had occurred in the restroom.
Not long after, Defendant and his passenger
drove away in the Lexus. The officers
followed the Lexus into the center of
Wilmington but lost sight of the vehicle.
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Later that evening, the officers again
conducted surveillance at 6 S. Gray Avenue
and observed Defendant's parked Lexus.
From all these circumstances, the officers
reasonably believed that Defendant was
residing at 6 S. Gray Avenue.
During the same week in March 2001, the
officers conducted further surveillance at 6
S. Gray Avenue and observed a black
Nissan pickup truck parked in the rear
driveway of the premises. The officers
performed an identification check on the
license plate number of the truck and found
it was registered to a William R. Church and
Erna Church of 2 Commonwealth
Boulevard, New Castle, Delaware. This is
the same address noted on Defendant's
driver's license. The officers continued
surveillance of 6 S. Gray Avenue on a daily
basis throughout the remainder of March of
2001 and observed both the Lexus and the
pickup truck parked at the premises.
Surveillance continued into April. The
officers again observed Defendant leave 6 S.
Gray Avenue, enter the pickup truck, and
drive to a dwelling at 1725 W. 2nd Street,
which he entered. On April 12, 2001,
officers viewed Defendant arrive at 6 S.
Gray Avenue in the pickup truck and unload
a motorcycle from the bed of the pickup
truck. Shortly thereafter, Defendant drove
from 6 S. Gray Avenue in the pickup truck
to the area of Second and Scott Streets.
Defendant parked the vehicle and carried
two large black duffel bags into 1725 W. 2nd
Street. The officers could tell that the bags
were empty since they were lying flat on
Defendant's shoulder. Approximately fifteen
minutes later, Defendant was observed
leaving the premises with the bags, which
now appeared filled and heavy. Defendant
placed the bags in the back of the pickup
truck. The officers, accompanied by
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Detective Thomas Dempsey, were in an
unmarked car and not in uniform.
According to his testimony, Detective
Vincent Jordan parked his unmarked vehicle
in a space directly behind Defendant's
pickup truck, in such a manner that it did not
obstruct
Defendant's
vehicle
from
leaving.— Detective Jordan observed a
minivan parked in front of Defendant's
vehicle, but there was sufficient room
between the front of Defendant's vehicle and
the rear of the minivan for Defendant to
maneuver his vehicle out of its parking
space.
FN3. Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 16.
*3 Detective Jordan approached Defendant's
pickup truck, knocked on the window and
identified himself as a police officer. At the
time, Detective Jordan was wearing his
Wilmington Police identification badge
around his neck. Detective Dempsey was
also dressed in plain clothes, and neither he
nor Detective Jordan were displaying their
weapons. At the moment Detective Jordan
identified himself, it appeared that
Defendant pressed the speed dial button on
his cellular phone and then placed the phone
on the floor of the vehicle. Detective Jordan
believed that Defendant was attempting to
warn someone on the line that he was being
approached. Detective Jordan requested that
Defendant step down from the vehicle at
which point the Detective reached into the
vehicle, picked up the phone, and could hear
another male's voice on the phone asking
what was going on.— The Detective closed
the flip top phone and asked the names of
Defendant and the owner of the vehicle.
Defendant responded that his name was
Khyon Church and that the pickup truck
belonged to his father. When questioned as
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to his destination, Defendant responded that
he was "going on a trip." — When asked
about the contents of the duffel bags,
Defendant replied that they "contained
clothing for his trip." EH^
FN4. Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 18.
FN5. Id.
FN6. Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 19.
After questioning Defendant a second and
third time about the contents of the duffel
bags, Defendant stated that the bags
contained drugs, specifically marijuana.—
Defendant was detained and handcuffed.
Defendant's vehicle, and the bags which
were still in it, were transported to the
Wilmington central police station. Detective
Sutton of the K-9 Unit performed a canine
search of the bags. The dog was alerted to
the scent of marijuana. Once opened, the
bags were found to contain a combined
quantity of approximately 24.99 pounds of
marijuana. Defendant was read his Miranda
rights and arrested.
FN7. Id.
Upon Defendant's arrest, the officers applied
for a search warrant for both 1725 W. 2nd
Street and 6 S. Gray Avenue, believing there
to be more marijuana plants, drugs, drug
monies, paraphernalia and other contraband
at these premises. At the time the search
warrant was issued, the police officers had
reason to believe that the Defendant was
actually living at 6 S. Gray Avenue and that
he was probably using 1725 W. 2nd Street as
a stash house for his drugs and for the
proceeds from the sale of drugs. After
executing the search warrant at 1725 W. 2nd
Street, the officers uncovered approximately
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30 pounds of marijuana and two handguns.
The search warrant completed at 6 S. Gray
Avenue produced approximately 24 grams
of powdered cocaine and another handgun.
A hearing on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress was conducted on October 7, 2002.
— At the conclusion of the hearing, the
Court denied Defendant's motion with
respect to all claims, but reserved decision
on the issue of the evidence found at 6 S.
Gray Avenue. On October 22, 2002, the
State filed its response in opposition to the
suppression of the evidence recovered from
the 6 S. Gray Avenue residence.
FN8. Defendant initially filed his
Motion to Suppress on June 20, 2001
and then filed an Amended Motion
to Suppress on September 25, 2001.
At the suppression hearing originally
held on October 15, 2001, the Court
denied Defendant's Motion to
Suppress based solely on the
statement of facts and law contained
in the initial Motion to Suppress. As
the Court and the State were not
made
aware
of
Defendant's
Amended Motion to Suppress at the
time of the suppression hearing, the
Court was unable to address all of
the pending issues. Accordingly, the
Court vacated the order denying the
Motion to Suppress entered on
October
15, 2001. Defendant
subsequently filed the instant motion
on December 6, 2001 and submitted
a memorandum of law in support of
motion to suppress evidence on May
7, 2002.
Defense Contentions
*4 Defendant contends that the search of 6
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S. Gray Avenue violated his Federal and
State constitutional rights insofar as the
information obtained from his primary
detention was tainted. Therefore, Defendant
argues, all references to information
gathered because of that illegal action
represents "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Additionally, Defendant maintains that the
affidavit in support of the search warrant
lacked the necessary probable cause to
support a reasonable belief that evidence
would be found at the 6 S. Gray Avenue
premises.
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citizenry by requiring a showing of probable
cause before issuance of a search warrant
affidavit upon oath or affirmation. 2 ^ The
probable cause provision was integrated into
the present Delaware Constitution and
Declaration of Rights in 1792 and has never
been altered. 2 ^ The addition of the
probable cause provision in 1792 by the
framers of Delaware's Declaration of Rights
was more than an integral adjunct to the oath
requirement for search warrants. It proved to
be an invaluable enhancement of the right
against illegal searches and seizures rights
set forth in Delaware's 1776 Constitution
and Declaration of Rights. 2 ^

Standard Of Review
On motions to suppress evidence presented
to this Court, the defendant bears the burden
of establishing that the challenged search or
seizure violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. — Further, it is the defendant who
must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is entitled to relief. 2 ^
FN9. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
130 n. 1 (1978); State v.. Bien-Aime,
Del.Super., Cr. A. No. IK92-080326, Toliver, J. (Mar. 17, 1993)
(Mem.Op.).
FN 10. Bien-Aime at 3 (citing United
States v. Casteneda, 951 F.2d 44, 48
£5thCirJ992)).
Discussion
The protections afforded in the Fourth
Amendment safeguard the public against
unreasonable searches and seizures and
require that a search warrant may be issued
only upon a showing of probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation. ^ ^ The
Delaware Constitution ensures the same
fundamental right and security for its

FN11. The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. U.S. Const,
amend. XIV.
FN 12. Article 1, § 6 of the Delaware
Constitution provides:
Section 6. The people shall be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions, from
unreasonable
searches and seizures; and no
warrant to search any place, or to
seize any person or thing, shall issue
without
describing
them
as
particularly as may be; nor then,
unless there be probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation.
Del. Const, art. U 6.

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in A.2d
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 31840887 (Del.Super.)
(Cite as: Not Reported in A.2d)
FN13. Dorsev v. State, 761 A.2d
807, 817 (Del.2000); see also Jones
v. State, 745 A.2d 856 (Del 1999) In
Jones, the Delaware Supreme Court
concluded that the history of the
search and seizure provisions in the
Delaware Constitution imparted
different and broader protections
than those afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 865-66.
FN14. Dorsev, 761 A.2d at 817.
In furtherance of the guarantee of protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures,
our General Assembly has set forth in §
2306 and § 2307 of the Delaware Code the
statutory requirements that are necessary for
a constitutionally adequate showing of
probable cause. The language of § 2306 of
Title 11 provides that the affidavit in support
of a search warrant:
[S]hall designate the house, place,
conveyance or person to be searched and the
owner or occupant thereof (if any), and shall
describe the things or persons sought as
particularly as may be, and shall
substantially allege the cause for which the
search is made or the offense committed by
or in relation to the persons or things
searched for, and shall state that the
complainant suspects that such persons or
things are concealed in the house, place,
conveyance or person designated and shall
recite the facts upon which such suspicion is
founded. 1 ^ 1

FN15. UDel. C. § 2306.
Delaware courts have interpreted the
probable cause standard of $ 2306 to
require that the underlying affidavit in
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support of the search warrant must establish
sufficient
cause
for
the
warrant's
issuance.^^ The Delaware Supreme Court
"has eschewed a hypertechnical approach to
the evaluation of the search warrant affidavit
in favor of a common-sense interpretation. "
^ ^ More importantly, "the affidavit
supporting the search warrant must be
'considered as a whole and not on the basis
of separate allegations." ' ^ ^
FN16. Wilson v. State, 314 A.2d 905,
906-907(061.1973) (citing Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
FN 17. United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965); see also
Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d 404, 409
(Del. 1989); Jensen v. State, 482
A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984); Pierson v.
State, 338 A.2d 571, 573-74
(Del. 1975); Edwards v. State, 320
A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1974); Wilson v.
State, 314 A.2d 905, 906-907
(Del. 1973); (emphasis added).
FN18. Gardner, 567 A.2d at 409
(quoting Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d at
111) (emphasis added). Accord
Dorsev, 761 A.2d at 811-812
(upholding the four corners test for
probable cause required by 11 Del.
C. § 2306 in that the four corners of
the affidavit must comport with £
2306fs
requirement
that
the
complaint 'recite the facts' regarding
why the items sought would be
found at the place to be searched);
Dunfee v. State, 346 A.2d 173, 175
(Del. 1975) (stating that the factual
sufficiency of an affidavit is tested
by considering it as a whole and not
in terns of its isolated component
allegations); Edwards, 320 A.2d at
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703 (noting that when testing for
requirements, the affidavit must be
considered as a whole, and not in an
isolated seriatim fashion); Rossitto v.
State, 234 A.2d 438, 439-40
(Del. 1967) (holding that allegations
of an affidavit filed in support of an
application for a search warrant may
not be isolated each from the other.
The affidavit must be considered as a
whole); Mezzatesta v. State, 166
A.2d
433.
437
(Del. 1960)
(articulating that the affidavit must
be considered as a whole in
determining if the allegations justify
the issuing of a search warrant).
*5 In issuing a search warrant, a judicial
officer must comply with the procedural and
substantive requirement of § 2307 as
follows:
If the judge, justice of the peace or other
magistrate finds that the facts recited in the
complaint constitute probable cause for the
search, that person may direct a warrant to
any proper officer or to any other person by
name for service. The warrant shall
designate the house, place, conveyance or
person to be searched, and shall describe the
things or persons sought as particularly as
possible... ¥ j m

FN19. UDelC.

§ 2307.

This Court has held that the foregoing two
statutory sections establish a four corners
test for probable cause.^^ There must exist
adequate facts on the face of the affidavit so
that a reviewing court can verify that
probable cause existed for issuance of the
warrant. 2 ^ 1 It is the duty of a reviewing
court to give c great deference' to the
magistrate's or judge's determination that a
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warrant is supported by probable cmseP^
Additionally, there is the requirement that
all facts relied upon by the magistrate be in
the written affidavit to insure that the
reviewing Court may determine whether the
constitutional requirements have been met
without reliance upc
upon faded and often
confused memories/
FN20. Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d
571, 573 (Del.1975).
FN21.M
FN22. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (quoting
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410,419(1969)).
FN23. Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d
807, 811 (Del.2000) (quoting
Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 574
(Del. 1975)); Henry v. State, 373
A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 1977).
It is firmly established that the reviewing
court must determine whether a search
warrant affidavit contained sufficient factual
information when issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate or judicial officer to
form a reasonable belief that an offense has
been committed and that seizable property
would be found in a particular place or on a
particular person. 2 ^- In other words, "[t]he
critical element in a reasonable search is not
that the owner of the property is suspected
of a crime but that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the specific 'things' to be
searched for and seized are located on the
property to which entry is sought." ^ ^ A
warrant will not be overturned if this
probable cause is apparent. 2 ^ Moreover,
this Court has consistently held that "it is
axiomatic that there be a nexus between the
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items which are sought and the place in
which the police wish to search for them ."
FN27

FN24. Dorset 16\ A.2d at 811; see
also Carter v. State, 418 A.2d 989,
992 (Del. 1980): Edwards, 320 A.2d
at 703; Wilson, 314 A.2d at 906-907.
FN25. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978) (citing
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132(1925)).
FN26. Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189,
203 (Del. 1980) (citing Brinemr v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1949)).
FN27. State v. Jones, 2000 WL
33114361
(Del.Super.)
(citing
Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 811); Hooks,
416 A.2d at 203; Pierson, 338 A.2d
at 573.
Defendant concedes in his motion "that
putting aside other alleged constitutional
infirmities, there was probable cause to
arrest and search. That fact does not,
however, justify a search of the Gray
Avenue residence." In support of this
contention, Defendant relies on the holding
in State v. JonesP^ In Jones, this Court
held that the affidavit, which supported the
search warrant of the defendants' residence,
lacked the requisite showing of probable
cause. As a result, the evidence seized at the
defendants' residence was suppressed.-^^
But Jones can be distinguished from the
case at bar because the objects to be sought,
as specified in the affidavit in Jones,
included employee payrolls, paperwork
relating to defendants' employees, and
business records located at the defendants'
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place of business and residence. A search of
defendants' residence instead produced
cocaine and handguns. There was no direct
evidence on the face of the affidavit that the
police had probable cause to believe that
cocaine and handguns would be found at
defendants' residence. In contrast, based on
the information in the affidavit provided by
Detectives Jordan, Cuadrado and Janvier,
there was ample probable cause for the
police to believe drugs, contraband, and
associated drug trafficking paraphernalia
would be found at 6 S. Gray Avenue. Thus,
there was a logical connection between the
items sought and the premises searched.

FN28. State v. Jones, 1997 WL
528274 (Del.Super.).
FN29. Id at*4.
*6 Defendant similarly relies upon State v.
Ada, which he purports factually bears the
greatest similarity to his c a s e . 2 ^ In Ada,
the defendant maintained two separate
residences, Apartment C-4, 3501 Lancaster
Avenue and 2724 West 4th Street. Although
police surveillance, a controlled drug buy,
and exigent circumstances substantiated a
warrantless search of the Apartment C-4
residence, the Court held that there were
insufficient facts set forth in the affidavit of
probable cause to form a nexus between the
items sought and the West 4th Street
residence. 2 ^ 1 The defendant was observed
coming and going from the West 4th Street
residence and using a key to enter and lock
the front door. Yet, the police observed no
illegal or suspicious activity occurring at the
residence.^^- No other objective evidence
existed to link the defendant to this
residence. 2 ^

FN30. State v. Ada, 2001 WL
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in A.2d
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 31840887 (Del.Super.)
(Cite as: Not Reported in A.2d)
660227 (Del.Super.).
FN31.Mat*5.
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a concerned citizen, rather than from a past
proven and reliable informant as in this
instance. 1 ^

FN32. Id
FN34.7#at*L
FN33.Hat*4.
The objective evidence linking the
Defendant to 6 S. Gray Avenue in this case
was far more substantial than in Jones and
Ada. During the last week of March 2001,
police surveillance revealed Defendant
leaving this residence with an unknown
black male and traveling to a restaurant to
conduct what appeared to be a drug
transaction. Additionally, police had
observed Defendant's Lexus and a pickup
truck on several occasions parked at 6 S.
Gray Avenue as well as at 1725 W. 2nd
Street. Police monitored Defendant traveling
at different times in both vehicles to and
from these two residences. The police could
reasonably have concluded based on
information provided in the affidavit, that
Defendant was living at 6 S. Gray Avenue
and storing his drugs at 1725 W. 2nd Street.
Based upon the trips to and from the
residences observed by police, the likelihood
was great that drugs and associated
paraphernalia would be uncovered at both
addresses. In Ada, the contested search
warrant was executed at West 4th Street,
believed to be the defendant's stash house,
not his residence. Here, the search
performed at 6 S. Gray was the Defendant's
residence. The information contained in the
four corners of the Ada affidavit pertaining
to the officers' experience with regard to
drugs being kept in the home was not
applicable to the West 4th Street stash house.
The facts set forth in the search warrant
affidavit in this case were specific with
respect to the items sought at 6 S. Gray
Avenue. Also, the tip in Ada originated from

Adopting the common sense interpretation
laid down by the Delaware Supreme Court,
the Court has reviewed the four corners of
the search warrant affidavit in this case and
finds that the factual circumstances and
information
contained
therein
were
sufficient to warrant the police officers to
believe that drugs, drug paraphernalia, and
contraband would be found at 6 S. Gray
Avenue. Upon examination of the factual
adequacy of the affidavit as a whole, and not
in terms of its isolated component
allegations, sufficient probable cause exists
to establish a nexus between the items that
were sought and Defendant's residence due
to the following factors: 1) a past proven and
reliable informant contacted police that a
black male known as "Ky" was selling large
amounts of marijuana from 1725 W. 2nd
Street; 2) Defendant and an unidentified
male were observed leaving 1725 W. 2nd
Street, traveling to 6 S. Gray Avenue,
whereupon Defendant checked his mail,
entered, then exited the residence and drove
to Up The Creek Restaurant to conduct a
probable drug sale; 3) Defendant's Lexus
and pickup truck were observed parked at
1725 W. 2nd Street and 6 S. Gray Avenue on
a daily basis; 4) Defendant was observed
traveling from 6 S. Gray Avenue to 1725 W.
2nd leading police to believe that he was
using 6 S. Gray Avenue as a residence and
1725 W. 2nd as a stash house for his drugs;
5) Defendant was observed leaving 6 S.
Gray Avenue, traveling to and entering 1725
W. 2n Street with empty duffel bags, and
exiting with full bags; 6) the affiants'
statement that, based on their training,

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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experience, and participation in other drug
investigations, it is common for drug
traffickers to secrete contraband, proceeds of
drug sales and records of drug transactions
in secure locations within their residence
and/or businesses for their ready access and
to conceal the same from law enforcement
officers; and 7) the affiants' statement that
drug traffickers only transport enough drugs
that they will need for a sale and generally
maintain the rest of their drugs at a secured
location, including, but not limited to, their
residence.

the affidavit, law enforcement officials
could reasonably believe that drugs were
being stored at 6 S. Gray Avenue.

*7 Within the parameters of the Fourth
Amendment and Article I $ 6 of the
Delaware
Constitution,
there
is a
fundamental distinction between probable
cause to arrest and probable cause to search.
Probable cause to arrest concerns a "person"
and whether a criminal act has been
committed or is being committed by a
person to be arrested. Probable cause to
search involves a "place" and whether
evidence or illegal instrumentalities will be
discovered in a particular location. In United
States v. Whitner, the Third Circuit upheld
the contention embedded in the Fourth
Amendment that "probable cause to arrest
does not automatically provide probable
cause to search the arrestee's home." FN35 In
United States v. Jones, the Third Circuit
stated, however, "although probable cause to
arrest does not automatically provide
probable cause to search the defendant's
home, the fact that probable cause to arrest
has been established increases the
probability that the defendant is storing
evidence of that crime in the defendant's
residence." ^ ^ By Defendant's own
admission in his motion, there was probable
cause to arrest. Based on the outcome of
police surveillance efforts in the months of
March and April, 2001, and the evidence
obtained upon Defendant's arrest detailed in

In consideration of the information supplied
by the past proven and reliable informant as
to drug dealing from 1725 W. 2nd Street, the
affiants' personal observations of the
Defendant, and the experience of the police
officers fully enumerated in the affidavit, the
Court finds that the issuing judicial officer
possessed sufficient grounds to reasonably
believe that the items listed in the search
warrant would be found at 6 S. Gray
Avenue. In State v. Jones, this Court
affirmed that, "[DJirect evidence that items
will be present at the premises to be
searched pursuant to the warrant is not
always required in a search warrant." ^ ^
The lack of "direct evidence," e.g., a
controlled drug purchase made from 6 S.
Gray Avenue and/or an informant's tip that
the Defendant maintained or sold drugs from
6 S. Gray Avenue, within the four corners of
the search warrant, to suggest that drugs or
contraband could be seized at 6 S. Gray
Avenue, does not negate the adequacy of a
finding of probable cause. Defendant's
conduct leading up to his arrest and
possession of large quantities of marijuana
upon his arrest provided police with more
than mere fodder or suspicion that the
Defendant stored contraband or drugs in his
residence at 6 S. Gray Avenue.

FN35. United States v. Whitney 219
F.3d 289, 297 (3rd Cir.2000)
(quoting United States v. Jones, 994
F.2d 1051. 1055 (3rd Cir.1993):
Dorset 761 A.2dat812.
FN36. United States v. Jones. 994
F.2d at 1055-56.
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substantiating the Court's
sufficient probable cause.

finding

of

FN41. Id. (emphasis added).
In State v. Jones, the defendant similarly
argued that the four corners of the search
warrant lacked probable cause to support a
belief that marijuana would be found at his
residence, and that it was mere speculation
that the police thought that defendant kept
contraband or drugs in his residence. ^^ In
support of his allegation, defendant stressed
the fact there were no controlled buys from
the residence, no surveillance of the
residence, and no informant who told police
that defendant kept drugs in his residence .
^ ^ The Jones Court found probable cause
existed even in the absence of the above
three elements.^^ In the case at bar, while
there were no controlled buys or information
provided by an informant, information
obtained
through
law
enforcement
surveillance efforts, coupled with other
specific facts provided in the affidavit,
established the requisite nexus between the
items sought and the Defendant's residence.

FN38. State v. Jones, 2000 WL
33114361, at *2 (Del.Super.).

The recent Fourth Circuit case of United
States v. Hargis, significantly mirrors the
circumstances surrounding
Defendant's
claim of insufficient probable cause.^^ In
Hargis, the defendant asserted that the
warrant was facially invalid because it
lacked the necessary probable cause, having
omitted any evidence of a nexus between
defendant's drug trafficking and his
residence.^^ Despite his assertion, the
Court held that the affidavit did provide
strong support for probable cause to search
Defendant's residence. ^ ^ The affidavit
contained reliable information that: 1) the
defendant brought drugs to the location of
his drug dealing in his car from another
location; 2) the defendant was observed on
several occasions going back and forth
between his residence and the location of his
drug dealing; and 3) the police officer stated
that, based on his training and experience,
street-level dealers frequently store drugs in
their homes.^^ In this case, the same
factual elements, and perhaps more, were
present to implicate 6 S. Gray Avenue in
Defendant's drug trafficking enterprise.

FN39. Id.
FN40. Id at *4 (emphasis added).
*8 Moreover, in Jones, this Court held that
"a police officer's training and experience
may be taken into consideration in
determining probable cause when combined
with other factors." ^ ^ In addition to the
factual items previously discussed, the
affidavit contained significant information
attesting to the affiants' experience and
training in drug investigations, further

FN42. United States v. Harzis, 2002
WL 1336658 (4th Cir.(Md.)).
FN43.M at*l.
FN44. Id
FN45. Id
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing facts and statements
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contained within the four corners of the
affidavit in support of the search warrant
and the fact that probable cause existed to
arrest Defendant, this Court finds sufficient
probable cause was established to execute a
valid search of 6 S. Gray Avenue.
Accordingly, there are sufficient specific
facts set forth in the affidavit to form a
nexus between the items that were sought
and Defendant's residence.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
challenged search and seizure violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. For all the
foregoing reasons, Defendant's Consolidated
Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Del.Super.,2002.
State v. Church
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 31840887
(Del.Super.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for
Official Publication)
BENCH.
*1 Inventory searches are a well recognized
exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. See State v. Hygh 711
P.2d 264, 267-68 (Utah 1985) (citing South
Dakota v. Ovverman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct.
3092 (1976)). "In order to support a finding
that a valid inventory search has taken place,
the court must first determine whether there
was reasonable and proper justification for
the impoundment of the vehicle." Id. at 268.
The State must also show " 'that there exists
an established reasonable procedure for
safeguarding impounded vehicles and their
contents and that the challenged police
activity was essentially in conformance with
that procedure.' " Id. at 269 (quoting 2
Wayne H. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 7.4
at 576-77 (1978)).
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Defendant concedes that his vehicle was
justifiably impounded. He argues, however,
that the trial court erred in finding the
inventory search valid because the State
failed to meet its burden to establish that a
standardized procedure for inventory
searches existed and that the officer
complied with the procedure when
conducting the search of defendant's vehicle.
Specifically, defendant argues that the best
evidence rule. Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, requires the State to introduce
the actual written policy at the suppression
hearing. We disagree. The best evidence rule
does not apply because the determination as
to the admissibility of the gun was not made
at trial, but rather was made at a pretrial
suppression hearing, where the rules of
evidence do not apply. See Utah R.Evid.
1 lOUbYl) and Utah R.Evid. 104(a). m

FN1. A defendant who wishes to
make an evidentiary challenge, such
as a best evidence objection under
Rule 1002, must proceed to trial and
make the evidentiary challenge there.
Even if the best evidence rule did apply, the
State is not bound to "submit written
procedures in order to carry its burden of
showing that its agents acted in accordance
with
standardized
procedures
when
performing an inventory search of an
impounded automobile." State v. Stricklinz
844 P.2d 979, 989 (Utah Ct.App.1992). In
Strickling, as in the instant case, evidence
regarding the procedures for inventory
searches came solely from the testimony of
the searching officer at a pretrial suppression
hearing. Id at 988. The testimony of the
officer in the instant case, like the testimony
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of the officer in Strickling, was sufficient to
establish the existence of, and compliance
with, standardized procedures. Additionally,
defendant's contention that the inventory
search was invalid because the officer failed
to complete it himself is without merit. The
fact that the first officer did not complete the
search himself is unimportant because the
record reflects that a second officer
completed it.
Defendant next argues that the trial court
erred in finding the inventory search valid
because it was conducted as a pretext to an
investigative motive. We again disagree.
The law allows an officer to impound a
vehicle "with registration that has been
expired for more than three months." Utah
Code Ann. § 41-la-110iqyf)(T) (1998).
The officer in this case testified that he
routinely impounds when a vehicle is well
past the required time for registration, as
defendant's vehicle was in this case. In
Strickling, the court determined that the
State produced the necessary threshold
evidence when the impounding officer
testified that he impounds sixty to seventyfive percent of the vehicles he stops for
expired plate registrations. See Strickling,
844 P.2d at 987. The court then stated that
u
[t]he determinative evidence here is what
the officer actually did, without regard to his
motives in a particular case, when
confronted with registration violations." Id.
The uncontroverted testimony of the officer
in the instant case is that he impounds
ninety-nine percent of the vehicles he stops
when plate registration expired nine months
earlier. Moreover, in addition to the long
expired registration, defendant could not
provide proof of insurance, further
demonstrating that impoundment was
proper. Upon properly impounding the
vehicle, an inventory search was required.
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*2 The long expired registration and the
defendant's inability to provide proof of
insurance, coupled with the officer's stated
impoundment practices, demonstrate that the
officer properly conducted the inventory
search in accordance with established policy
and procedure. Therefore, even assuming
the continued viability of the pretext
doctrine in inventory search cases, there was
no pretext in this case.—
FN2. Compare State v. Hvzh 711
P.2d at 268 (stating the inventory
exception does not apply when the
inventory is merely a pretext) with
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138
(Utah 1994) (rejecting the pretext
doctrine in traffic stops).
We see no reason to disturb the trial court's
determination that the inventory search of
defendant's vehicle was valid. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court's refusal to suppress
the evidence and defendant's resulting
conviction.
GREENWOOD, A.P.J., and DAVIS, J.,
concur.
Utah App., 1999.
State v. Clifford
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244693
(Utah App.), 1999 UT App 112
END OF DOCUMENT
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